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SELF-INCRIMINATION:
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FIFTH

TREATI-United States v. Milder, 329 F.

AMENDMENT

IN

RE-

Supp. 759 (D. Neb. 1971).

Defendant, while working as an accountant for the Milder Oil
Company from 1964 through 1966, was supplementing his regular
income by embezzling funds. Although he filed income tax returns for

those years, he failed to disclose the income derived from this supplemental source and therefore was convicted of income tax evasion
under section 7201 of the Internal Revenue Code.' On motion for a
new trial, he contended that the conviction was improper since, by virtue
of his fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination, he was not
2
required to report embezzled funds as income.
Although the district court in United States v. Milder3 agreed that
by reporting this income defendant would be forced to incriminate
himself, it denied defendant's motion for a new trial on the ground that
the fifth amendment privilege was not an available defense in a prosecution for tax evasion.4 It found that this right was in direct conflict with
the congressional power to tax income under the sixteenth amendment,
and, since the sixteenth amendment was " 'the last expression of the will
of the lawmaker,'" it prevailed over the fifth amendment. 5
The leading Supreme Court case dealing with the relationship
between the fifth amendment and the income tax reporting statute is
United States v. Sullivan,6 decided in 1927. There, defendant, a bootlegger in illegal liquor, was convicted of willfully refusing to file an
income tax return. 7 As a defense he pleaded the fifth amendment, contending that by filing a return he would be forced to disclose his illegal occupation, thereby incriminating himself.8 The Supreme Court,
however, rejected this claim and held that the fifth amendment did
not entitle a person to flatly refuse to answer all of the questions on
the return. It was noted that if the defendant did not choose to answer
§ 7201:
Any person who willfully attempts in any manner to evade or defeat any tax
imposed by this title or the payment thereof shall, in addition to other penalties
provided by law, be guilty of a felony and, upon conviction thereof, shall be fined
not more than $10,000, or imprisoned not more than 5 years, or both, together
with the costs of prosecution.
2 United States v. Milder, 329 F. Supp. 759, 760 (D. Neb. 1971).
3 329 F. Supp. 759 (D. Neb. 1971).
4 Id. at 763-64.
5 Id. (quoting from Schick v. United States, 195 U.S. 65, 68-69 (1904)).
6 274 U.S. 259 (1927).
7 Id. at 262.
8 Sullivan v. United States, 15 F.2d 809, 810 (4th Cir. 1926), rev'd, 274 U.S. 259 (1927).
1 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954,
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specific incriminatory questions he should have filed an incomplete
return and then raised his fifth amendment privilege., Reserved for
another time was the question of "what, if anything, [defendant] might
have withheld."'10
The scope of the fifth amendment privilege as it relates to selfreporting statutes was further restricted by the Supreme Court in 1953
and 1955, when it decided United States v. Kahriger and Lewis v.
United States.12 These cases upheld the constitutionality of the federal
wagering statutes as against the allegation that they were violative of
the fifth amendment. It was these cases which, prior to 1968, discouraged
attacks on the federal self-reporting statutes.' s However, in that year the
Supreme Court decided the triad of cases consisting of Marchetti v.
United States,14 Grosso v. United States,15 and Haynes v. United States6
which overruled Kahrigerand Lewis, and invited a frontal attack on all
similar self-reporting statutes. In Milder, the defendant initiated such
an attack, and, though Marchetti, Grosso, and Haynes could have been
easily distinguished on their facts, the district court declined to do so,
but, instead, found that Milder had been "prosecuted for refusing to
relinquish his Fifth Amendment right not to be compelled to be a
witness against himself.'

7

Marchetti and Grosso involved statutes imposing occupational' 8
and excise 19 taxes on wagering. Those who were subject to the occupa20
tional tax were required to register with the Internal Revenue Service
and to conspicuously post stamps, which were distributed upon paying
the tax, in their places of business. 2' Those subject to the excise tax
on wagering were required to submit monthly, to the Internal Revenue
Service, a disclosure form expressly designed for the sole use of those
engaged in the wagering business. 22 The defendants in Marchetti and
Grosso were convicted of failing to pay these taxes and also of failing
9 274 U.S. at 263.
10 Id.
11 345 U.S. 22 (1953).
12 348 U.S. 419 (1955).
13 See Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 671-72 (1971).
14 390 U.S. 39 (1968).
15 390 U.S. 62 (1968).
16 390 U.S. 85 (1968).
17 329 F. Supp. at 763.
18 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 4411.
19 Id. § 4401.
20 Id. § 4412.
21 Id. ch. 69, § 6806(c), 68A Stat. 831, as amended, Revenue Act of 1968, 26 U.S.C.
§ 6806 (1970).
22 Grosso, 390 U.S. at 65.
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to register as required by the statutes. Granting their petitions for review, the United States Supreme Court reversed defendants' convictions, reasoning that since the statutes required defendants to give
information which would make them liable to prosecution under state
and federal gambling statutes, the fifth amendment was a complete
23
defense to such federal prosecutions.
Likewise, in Haynes, decided the same day, the Court reversed
a conviction for possession of an unregistered firearm. 24 It found that,
under the provisions of the National Firearms Act, 25 the possession
of an unregistered firearm and the failure to register such a firearm
were, in essence, the same offense, and therefore defendant would be
compelled to incriminate himself if he were forced to register the
26
firearm.
The Court in deciding Marchetti, Grosso and Haynes adopted the
rationale of its decision in Albertson v. Subversive Activities Control
Board.27 Throughout the opinions in these three cases the majority emphasized that:
The questions propounded .. .like those at issue in Albertson
... are "directed at a highly selective group inherently suspect of

criminal activities"; they concern, not "an essentially non-criminal
and regulatory area of inquiry," but "an area permeated with
criminal statutes." 28
It was this singling out of a specific group "inherently suspect of
criminal activities" and the fact that these returns could be used by
federal and state personnel in investigatory and prosecutory endeavors
which served as the determinative factors in the decisions.
The Court in Marchetti and Grosso stressed that the statutes were
aimed almost exclusively at illegal gambling and that legal wagering
was essentially excluded from the ambit of the Act. 29 The result of
compelling petitioners to file a return would be to subject them to possible state or federal prosecution for their disclosed wagering activities.
Likewise, in Haynes, the Court analyzed the National Firearms Act and,
after noting those persons and types of firearms exempt from the
Id. at 64-69; Marchetti, 390 US. at 60-61.
390 U.S. at 101.
25 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, ch. 53, §§ 5801-5862, 68A Stat. 721-29, as amended, Revenue
Act of 1968, 26 U.S.C. §§ 5801-5872 (1970).
26 390 U.S. at 95-100.
27 382 U.S. 70 (1965).
28 Haynes, 390 U.S, at 98-99 (quoting from Albertson v. Subversive Activities Control
Bd., 382 U.S. 70, 79 (1965)); Marchetti,390 U.S. at 47, 57; Grosso, 390 U.S. at 64-69.
29 Marchetti,390 U.S. at 42; Grosso, 390 U.S. at 65, 68.
28
24
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statute's provisions, concluded that the Act was "apparently intended
to guarantee that only weapons used principally by persons engaged
0
in unlawful activities would be subjected to taxation."
In this regard Milder is distinguishable from these cases since the
income tax statutes do not deal with areas "permeated with criminal
statutes" and with groups "inherently suspect of criminal activities."
Thus, what was said in Marchetti to distinguish that case from Sullivan
could have been adopted in Milder to distinguish it from the Marchetti
triad:
Unlike the income tax return in question in United States v.
Sullivan, .

.

. every portion of these requirements had the direct

and unmistakable consequence of incriminating petitioner ....

31

These distinguishing characteristics were utilized in the recent
Supreme Court case of Californiav. Byers,3 2 wherein the Court upheld
theconstitutionality of a California statute requiring a motorist to stop
after he is involved in an accident and disclose his name and address to
the other driver. The statute was upheld on the basis that since the
statute was not aimed at a " 'highly selective group inherently suspect of
criminal activities' -33 it did
not entail the kind of substantial risk of self-incrimination involved
in Marchetti, Grosso, and Haynes. Furthermore, the statutory
purpose is noncriminal
and self-reporting is indispensable to its
fulfillment.84
30 390 U.S. at 87 (footnote omitted). In 1969, relying on Marchetti, Grosso, and Haynes,
the Court in Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6 (1969) held that the transfer tax provisions
of the Marihuana Tax Act violated the privilege against self-incrimination, since compliance
with them "would have required petitioner unmistakably to identify himself as a member
of this 'selective' and 'suspect group .... " Id. at 18.
31 390 US. at 48-49. This same rationale had already been used to distinguish Sullivan
in Albertson v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 382 U.S. 70 (1965):
In Sullivan the questions in the income tax return were neutral on their face and
directed at the public at large, but here they are directed at a highly selective
group inherently suspect of criminal activities. Petitioners' claims are not asserted
in an essentially noncriminal and regulatory area of inquiry, but against an inquiry
in an area permeated with criminal statutes, where response to any of the form's
questions in context might involve the petitioners in the admission of a crucial
element of a crime.
Id. at 79. See Note, 13 VruL. L. REV. 650, 657 (1968).
82 402 U.S. 424 (1971); see Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 709-10 (1971) (Brennan, J., concurring); United States v. Fricano, 416 F.2d 434, 435 (2d Cir. 1969).
33 402 U.S. at 430.
84 Id. at 431. Judge McCree, dissenting in part in United States v. Whitehead,
424 F.2d 446, 453 (6th Cir. 1970), criticized the use of these characteristics to distinguish
Marchetti, Grosso, and Haynes, as follows:
character of the group subject to a disclosure requirement certainly is not
by itself determinative of the substantiality of the risk of self-incrimination atten-

mThe
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Notwithstanding the fact that Milder could have been distinguished
on these grounds, the district court was correct in not doing so. The
reason that Marchetti,Grosso, and Haynes emphasized areas "permeated
with criminal statutes" and groups "inherently suspect of criminal
activities" was not because they constituted a standard to be met in
determining the applicability of the fifth amendment. As Justice
Brennan aptly pointed out in his dissenting opinion in Byers, the emphasis was placed on these factors to show that petitioners were confronted with substantial hazards of self-incrimination. 5 Therefore, these
conditions were not imposed criteria or limitations but were facts which
were being used in the application of the established fifth amendment
standard. It was in the context of applying this standard that the Court,
in the Marchetti triad, examined the types of areas and persons at which
the statutes were aimed and thereafter concluded that petitioners' fifth
amendment rights were being infringed upon since a real and substantial danger of self-incrimination did exist.8 6 As the Court stated:
The central standard for the privilege's application has been
whether the claimant is confronted by substantial and "real," and
not merely trifling or imaginary, hazards of incrimination. 37
Referring to this standard and the position of the petitioners, the
Court stated:
In these circumstances, it would be impossible to say that the
hazards of incrimination which stem from the obligation to pay
the excise tax and to file [the required] form ... are "imaginary
and unsubstantial." . . . The criminal penalties for wagering with

which petitioner is threatened are scarcely "remote possibilities
out of the ordinary course of law," . . . yet he is obliged, on pain

of criminal prosecution, to provide information which would
readily incriminate him, and which he may reasonably expect
dant on compliance with such a requirement. Even if the requirement is not
directed at an inherently suspect group, the risk encountered as a consequence of
compliance may still be "real and appreciable."
s5 402 U.S. at 469-70 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
86 Justice Harlan, writing for the majority in United States v. United States Coin
& Currency, 401 U.S. 715 (1971) interpreted Marchetti and Grosso as follows:
Because the risk of self-incrimination was substantial, we held that a Fifth Amendment privilege could be raised as a defense to a criminal prosecution charging
failure to file the required forms.
Id. at 717. See United States v. Whitehead, 424 F.2d 446, 452 (6th Cir. 1970) (McCree, C.J.,
dissenting in part); Marshall v. United States, 422 F.2d 185, 194 (5th Cir. 1970). But see
United States v. Whitehead, supra at 450; United States v. Hunt, 419 F.2d 1, 3 (3d Cir.
1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1016 (1970); United States v. Walden, 411 F.2d 1109, 1114
(4th Cir. 1969).
37 Marchetti, 390 U.S. at 53.
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would be provided to prosecuting authorities. These hazards of
38
incrimination can only be characterized as "real and appreciable."
Therefore, the Milder court properly determined that:
[T]he mere fact that the income tax laws are directed primarily at
the public at large and thus lawful activity, rather than a particularized group engaged in illegal activity, does not resolve the
problem posed by the Fifth Amendment. 3 9
Besides rejecting the apparent limitations of the Marchetti triad,
the district court in Milder also presumably disregarded the previous
application of the "real and substantial" danger criterion in situations
involving self-reporting statutes, and adopted the rule that the fifth
amendment protects a person from "even so much as a tendency to
incriminate. ' 40 It further stated that, in the circumstances present,

[t]here can be little doubt . .. that had defendant reported his
embezzlement income, such information would have had more
than a tendency to incriminate him, and supplied the government
with a link in a chain of evidence which could be used to prosecute
him for embezzlement.41
The standard under the fifth amendment has been variously described as a "tendency to incriminate" 42 and a "reasonable cause to'
apprehend danger" 43 of incrimination. However, in cases involving the
registration and reporting requirements of various regulatory statutes,
the Supreme Court has consistently applied the "real and substantial
hazards of self-incrimination" criterion. 44 Under the facts in Milder,
Grosso, 390 U.S. at 66-67 (citations omitted).
39 329 F. Supp. at 763.
40 Id.
41 Id.
42 E.g., Emspak v. United States, 349 U.S. 190, 201 (1955) ("may tend to be incriminatory"); McCarthy v. Arndstein, 266 U.S. 34, 40 (1924) ("might tend to subject to criminal
responsibility"); Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, 563 (1892) C'will tend to criminate
him').
43 E.g., Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486 (1951) ("reasonable cause to apprehend danger"); Mason v. United States, 244 U.S. 362, 367 (1917) ("reasonable cause to
apprehend danger"); United States v. Doto, 205 F.2d 416, 417 (2d Cir. 1953) ("reasonable
cause to apprehend danger"). See also Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 600 (1896) (more than
a "remote and naked possibility" of danger); People v. Schultz, 380 Ill. 539, 544, 44 N.E.2d
601, 603 (1942) ('reasonable ground to apprehend danger"); Bradley v. O'Hare, 2 App. Div.
2d 436, 440, 156 N.Y.S.2d 533, 538 (1954) ("can reasonably be apprehended will lead to
incrimination").
44 California v. Byers, 402 U.S. 424, 429 (1971); United States v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601,
606 (1971); Minor v. United States, 396 U.S. 87, 97-98 (1969); Leary v. United States, 395
U.S. 6, 18 (1969); Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39, 53-54 (1968); Grosso v. United
States, 390 U.S. 62, 67 (1968); Haynes v. United States, 390 U.S. 85, 97 (1968).
38
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the conclusion of compulsory self-incrimination would be the same
regardless of which standard was applied.
In view of the inspection and disclosure provisions of the Treasury
Regulations, 45 defendant Milder would be faced with a real and substantantial danger of incrimination if he were to report his embezzled
income. These regulations provide for the inspection of any return by
a United States attorney, by an attorney of the Department of Justice, 4
by the Department of the Treasury, 4 and by "any other establishment
of the Federal Government." 48 These returns can be utilized in the
course of, or in the preparation for, United States grand jury proceedings or any litigation in which the United States is interested in the
result.

49

A good illustration of the danger of incrimination which can arise
from filing an income tax return is the case of United States v. Tucker,50
decided in 1970. While conducting a "routine audit" of Tucker's income
tax return, the Internal Revenue Service discovered that there existed
the possibility of a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 215 (1970), which prohibits
any employee of a bank insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation from accepting anything of value in return for procuring a loan
for a third party. Upon discovering this, the Internal Revenue Service
sent a letter containing the pertinent information to the United States
Attorney General's office. Thereafter the FBI conducted an investigation
which led to the criminal prosection of Tucker for the alleged violation
of the statute.51 After Tucker unsuccessfully moved to suppress the
information5 2 turned over by the Internal Revenue Service, he pleaded
nolo contendere and received a suspended sentence plus a fine. 53. In this
case the income tax return was not only a link in the chain of evidence
Treas. Reg. §§ 301.6103(a)-I to 301.6108-1 (1961).
Id. § 301.6103(a)-l(g) (1961).
47 Id. § 301.6103(a)-l(e) (1961).
48 Id. § 301.6103(a)-l(f) (1961).
49 Id. § 301.6103(a)-1(h) (1961). In Stillman v. United States, 177 F.2d 607 (9th Cir.
1949), the court of appeals commented:
[I]n many cases income tax returns have been used as evidence in prosecution of
crimes other than those arising out of income tax violations, without any discussion by the courts regarding the constitutional privilege.
Id. at 617. See Smith v. United States, 305 F.2d 197, 201 (9th Cir. 1962) (Dep't of Agriculture
prosecuted defendant on the basis of information derived from examination of defendant's
income tax return); Gibson v. United States, 31 F.2d 19, 22 (9th Cir. 1929) (prosecution for
violation of National Prohibition Act utilized defendant's income tax return).
50 316 F. Supp. 822 (D. Conn. 1970).
51 Id. at 823.
52 Id. at 827.
53 Telephone conversation with Mr. F. MacBuckley, Assistant United States Attorney
for the District of Connecticut, March 13, 1972.
45

46
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but it was the catalyst which initiated the investigation and subsequent
prosecution.
By recognizing that the effect of filing a completed income tax
return would be to expose defendant to the danger of self-incrimination
and by taking cognizance of the government's need to obtain tax revenues to support itself, the Milder court placed itself in the thicket between these two paramount and competing interests. It resolved this
dilemma by sacrificing the interest of the individual in favor of the
government. First, the court noted Marchetti, Grosso and Haynes involved taxing statutes authorized under article I, section 8 of the
Constitution and that in the present case the statutes were enacted
under the sixteenth amendment. 54 Then it found that
there is a direct conflict between the Fifth and Sixteenth Amendments, for if Congress is to effectively collect taxes on income it
must be able to require disclosure of the income and its sources,
and if the source happens to be illegal its disclosure will undoubtedly have an incriminating effect upon the taxpayer. 55
Utilizing the principle that when a constitutional amendment is inconsistent with a provision of the Constitution or with an earlier amendment the one later in time will prevail, the conflict was resolved in favor
5
of the sixteenth amendment.

6

The repeal or amendment, by implication, of a constitutional provision is not favored by the courts and is infrequently utilized. 57 The
rule usually applied is the one mentioned in Milder: "'When two principles come in conflict with each other, the court must give them both a
reasonable construction, so as to preserve them both to a reasonable extent.' "58 Self-reporting of income is a necessity if the government is
54 329 F. Supp. at 763-64. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 provides in part:
The Congress shall have Power to lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and
Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defense and general Welfare of the United States; but all Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uniform
throughout the United States ....
U.S. CONST. amend. XVI provides:

The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes on incomes, from whatever source derived, without apportionment among the several States, and without
regard to any census or enumeration.
55 329 F. Supp. at 764.
56 Id. The applicable rule is stated in Sutherland as follows:
The presumption against implied repeals is overcome ... by a showing that
the two acts are irreconcilable, clearly repugnant as to vital matters to which they
relate, and so inconsistent that the two cannot have concurrent operation.
1 J. SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 2014, at 470 (3d ed. 1943, Supp. 1972).
57 United States v. Welden, 377 U.S. 95, 102-03 n.12 (1964); see J. SUTHERLAND, supra at
§§ 2014, 2016, 2020.
58 329 F. Supp. 764 (quoting from United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 38, 39-40 (No.
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to conduct an efficient income tax system.5 9 At the same time, the
privilege against self-incrimination has been repeatedly declared to be
among the foremost freedoms of our constitutional system. 60 Therefore, the crux of the controversy in this case, as in other contemporary
cases attacking various self-reporting statutes necessary to effectuate a
valid governmental purpose, is whether the interests of the government
and the individual can both be accommodated.
The determination that reconciliation between the fifth and sixteenth amendments is impossible requires an inquiry into the available
alternatives and the difficulties coupled with each. The Milder court
noted that "it [was] influenced by the practical difficulties which might
ensue from a contrary holding," including the possibility that the
"federal income tax system would ultimately fall in a shambles, with
catastrophic effects upon the whole nation.""' The facts underlying
this acknowledgment will serve as the evaluative criteria in judging the
feasibility of any proposed solution. These facts are that the nation
cannot maintain itself without an income tax system and that this
system cannot be adequately sustained without self-reporting. Therefore, the alternatives are either to hold that the fifth amendment is inapplicable, as was done in Milder, or to find a method by which both
the efficient gathering of revenue and the protection against compulsory
self-incrimination can be maintained. This clash between the fifth
amendment and the self-reporting statutes was crystalized in the Byers
decision which was decided immediately prior to Milder and has significant impact on this issue.
Although the factual pattern and reporting statute involved in
Byers differs from that in Milder, Byers is of special interest and importance since it sets forth, in the various opinions of the Justices, the
different approaches to the self-incrimination/self-reporting dilemma.
Therefore, a discussion of the opinions in Byers will be undertaken in
order to elucidate the general approaches to the problem and examine
their applicability to the income tax statutes.
In Byers, the plurality essentially took the position that the hit-andrun self-reporting statute was not aimed at a group "inherently suspect
14,692e) (C.C.D. Va. 1807); see, e.g., Golconda Lead Mines v. Neill, 82 Idaho 96, 350 P.2d
221 (1960); cf. Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 596 (1896).
59 See, eg., 8A J. MERTENS, JR., FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 47.01 (rev. 1971).
60 In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 50 (1967) (a "great office in mankind's battle for freedom");
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 460 (1966) (" 'the hallmark of our democracy'"); Malloy
v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 7 (1964) (an "essential mainstay" of American system of criminal
prosecution).
61 329 F. Supp. at 764.
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of criminal activities" and therefore did not present a substantial risk of
self-incrimination. 2 As was demonstrated by the above discussion,
and by the concurring and dissenting opinions, this is fallacious reasoning.6 The plurality based its conclusion that no significant danger of
incrimination was present on the fact that "most accidents occur without
creating criminal liability." 64 However, as Justice Harlan pointed out
in his concurring opinion:
[I]f the privilege is truly a personal one, and the central standard
is the presence of "real" as opposed to "imaginary" risks of selfincrimination, such general empirical differences can only function
as evidentiary indicia in assessing the particular individual's
claim, in all the circumstances of his particular case, that if he were
to comply with the reporting requirement he would run a genuine
65
risk of incrimination.
Although Justice Harlan conceded that a "real" danger of incrimination
was present, he solved the problem by adopting a solution similar to that
adopted in Milder; he determined that such a risk did not warrant the
extension of the fifth amendment's privilege to essentially regulatory
schemes. 66 Therefore, he concurred in the plurality decision that the
statute should be upheld as constitutional without the imposition of
67
any restriction on the use of the compelled information.

In contrast to the plurality and concurring positions, the two dissenting opinions took the view that the statute could not escape the
fifth amendment's proscription without providing the individual with
adequate protection after he has made the compulsory disclosures.
The major difference between the dissenting opinions of Justice Black
and Justice Brennan was that the former adhered to the position of
the California Supreme Court which imposed a restriction on the use

of the compelled information; 68 whereas, Justice Brennan felt that the
only thing which could supplant the fifth amendment privilege was
62 402 U.S. at 431. The plurality opinion was written by Chief Justice Burger who was
joined by Justices Stewart, White and Blackmun.
63 Id. at 438-39 (Harlan, J., concurring); id. at 460-61 (Black, J., dissenting); id. at 46970 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
64 Id. at 431.
65 Id. at 442; Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367 (1951), wherein the Court stated:
[T]he decisions of this Court are explicit in holding that the privilege against
self-incrimination "is solely for the benefit of the witness," and "is purely a
personal privilege of the witness."
Id. at 371 (footnotes omitted).
66 402 U.S. at 438-39.
67 Id. at 458.
68 Id. at 463-64.
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transactional immunity.6 9 Specifically, Justice Brennan maintained that
a person cannot be compelled to report his involvement in an auto
accident unless he is "immune from prosecution under state law for
traffic offenses arising out of the conduct involved in the accident."70
The positions adopted in the Byers case clearly illustrate the difficulty involved in seeking a solution to the self-incrimination/selfreporting conflict. In order to evaluate the various alternatives as they
relate to the income tax statutes, it is essential to recognize the problem
as a three-dimensional one: first, the individual's interest in being free
from compulsory self-incrimination; second, the state and federal governments' interest in being able to adequately enforce their criminal
laws; and third, the government's interest in being able to operate an efficient, profitable, and equitable revenue-gathering system. Since all of
these are of considerable importance, the goal in resolving the conflict
among them should be to give each the optimum possible recognition,
while ensuring the adequate functioning of the others. As can readily
be seen, each one of the positions espoused in Byers has inherent weaknesses which, when applied to the income tax reporting requirement,
become even more pronounced. If the rationale of the plurality opinion, that the California statute did not pose a "real and substantial"
danger of incrimination, were applied to the income tax statutes, its
effect would be the same as in Byers, namely, to deny reality and to
abrogate the personal status of the fifth amendment privilege. To apply
transactional immunity to income tax returns, as proposed by Justice
Brennan, would have the effect of tolerating crime. Although a state
might be able to endure the abdication of its criminal sanctions relating
to violators of traffic laws who are involved in accidents, the government
could never endure such a waiver when it applies to a major portion
of all criminals.
Equally objectionable is the conclusion reached by Justice Harlan
that the fifth amendment should not be extended to essentially regulatory areas which require self-reporting; it has the weakness of upholding
two interests while completely sacrificing the third. The result which
69 Justice Brennan, concurring in Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 710 (1971),
described the grant of immunity necessary to supplant the fifth amendment privilege. In
discussing the government's power to require reports in collecting excise taxes, he stated:
And if the information has been compelled over a claim of privilege, application
of those cases requires that the individual be protected against the use of that
information in state prosecutions under the statutes making criminal the taxed
activity, and to complete immunity from prosecution under federal statutes of
like kind.
Id. at 710.
7o 402 U.S. at 478.
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comes closest to a feasible solution is the use restriction proposed by
Justice Black. However, this compromise proposal, as pointed out by
Justice Harlan, seriously impairs the enforcement of criminal laws.
This result is caused by the "presumption that evidence used in a
prosecution after the individual discloses his relationship to the regulated transaction would not have been available" in the absence of the
disclosure. 71 Because this presumption necessitates that the government
prove that its evidence was independently obtained, Justice Harlan
correctly observed that it would "render doubtful the State's ability to
prosecute in a large class of cases." 72 This impairment of the government's ability to prosecute would affect an even larger class of cases if
applied to income tax statutes.
The weakness in adopting one of the Byers positions is that each
Justice approached the problem from the traditional concepts developed under the fifth amendment. The fact that, due to governmental
needs, the individual cannot be given absolute protection from being
forced to disclose incriminating information is no reason to deny any
protection that can be afforded. Nor is the fact that absolute protection
has been strived for in the past a reason for inflexible adherence to this
policy in situations where such protection is impractical. The objective
should be to afford each interest as much recognition as possible, consistent with the practical needs of the others.
Following this accommodative approach, it appears that the best
solution to the income tax controversy would be to prohibit the Internal Revenue Service from disclosing the returns, or the information
contained therein, to any other department of the federal government or
to any state agency. If such a prohibition were adopted, and criminal
penalties were imposed on persons divulging the information on these
returns, it would protect against wholesale disclosure of these compelled
statements, while allowing the government to accomplish both its
revenue-raising purpose and the unimpaired enforcement of its criminal
sanctions. Although this proposal does not provide complete fifth
amendment protection, it is better than either totally denying it or im73
pairing the effective and necessary processes of government.
Thomas P. Simon
Id. at 443.
Id.
73 In essence, this is the approach the Supreme Court took with regard to the reporting requirements of the National Firearms Act. In Haynes, the Court held that the fifth
amendment privilege prohibited the government from prosecuting a person for either
failing to register a firearm under the Act or possessing an illegal firearm. Thereafter, the
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Act was amended by Congress, and the Court, in United States v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601 (1971),
held that the amended Act did not violate the fifth amendment privilege since,
(1) its provisions prohibited the direct or indirect use of any of the required information in a criminal prosecution; and
(2) "no information filed is as a matter of practice disclosed to any law enforcement
authority ... ." Id. at 604.
By taking this course, the Court was able to give appropriate recognition to the individual's right to be protected against compulsory self-incrimination, the government's
interest in taxing firearms and the government's interest in the proper enforcement of its
criminal sanctions. As the Freed Court pointed out, this solution does "not reach the
question of 'use immunity' as opposed to 'transactional immunity,' " but creates a scheme
in which "the hazards of self-incrimination are not real." Id. at 606 n.11.

EDITORIAL NOTE
While this Note was being published, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. United States v. Milder, No. 71-1443
(8th Cir., filed May 9, 1972). The court of appeals merely based its decision on United
States v. Sullivan, 274 U.S. 259 (1927), stating:
We reject appellant's argument that the constitutional guarantee of immunity from compulsory self-incrimination bars prosecutions such as the present
one. The Fifth Amendment does not release the recipient of illegal income from
his duty to file a federal income tax return, United States v. Sullivan, 274 U.S.
259 (1927), and it does not authorize him to falsify answers on a return submitted.
United States v. Knox, 396 U.S. 77 (1969).

